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Abstract
A model for availability growth is developed to capture the effect of sys-
temic risk prior to construction of a complex system. The model has been
motivated by new generation offshore wind farms where investment decisions
need to be taken before test and operational data are available. We develop
a generic model to capture the systemic risks arising from innovation in evo-
lutionary system designs. By modelling the impact of major and minor in-
terventions to mitigate weaknesses and to improve the failure and restoration
processes of subassemblies, we are able to measure the growth in availabil-
ity performance of the system. We describe the choices made in modelling
our particular industrial setting using an example for a typical UK Round
III offshore wind farm. We obtain point estimates of the expected avail-
ability having populated the simulated model using appropriate judgemental
and empirical data. We show the relative impact of modelling systemic risk
on system availability performance in comparison with estimates obtained
∗Corresponding Author
Email addresses: athena.zitrou@strath.ac.uk (Athena Zitrou),
tim.bedford@strath.ac.uk (Tim Bedford), lesley.walls@strath.ac.uk (Lesley
Walls)
Preprint submitted to Reliability Engineering & System Safety November 17, 2015
from typical system availability modelling assumptions used in offshore wind
applications. While modelling growth in availability is necessary for mean-
ingful decision support in developing complex systems such as offshore wind
farms, we also discuss the relative value of explicitly articulating epistemic
uncertainties.
Keywords: availability growth, systemic risk, offshore wind farm, condition
monitoring
1. Introduction
Our model is motivated by the need to support risk management deci-
sions in offshore wind, where there is considerable innovation as the industry
expands [20]. Empirical evidence indicates that availability performance of
new farms has been below expectations during early operational life, with
operating targets only being achieved after growing availability through the
implementation of effective fixes over, typically, the first four years of oper-
ation [2]. However, responsive remedial action to improve availability not
only impacts on income generation, but it also implies that extra capital
expenditure is being incurred during periods when only operational expen-
diture had been planned. This contributes to the problem of lack of equity
in the UK offshore wind energy market [40, 11] since projects are in compe-
tition for capital with other investment opportunities, and hence have to be
competitive in terms of risk and return.
In a bid to increase capacity and reduce Operation &Maintenance (O&M)
costs, the Cost Reduction Task Force [20] recommends the use of innovative
designs of high-yield, high-reliability turbines. However, new generation tur-
2
bines are technically immature systems that are to operate further from the
UK shore and in deeper waters than earlier versions. Hence, these new sys-
tems are subject to high physical stresses and are potentially vulnerable to
systemic weaknesses in design, operation, installation and manufacturing.
Therefore, paradoxically, the bid to decrease cost and accelerate offshore
wind deployment actually increases some investor risks. Of course, as man-
ufacturers and operators gain better understanding of operation and the en-
vironment, technical issues can be resolved through a series of interventions
such as design upgrades, modified operational processes or changes in main-
tenance activities. However, commercial organisations, private investors and
governments are required to make investment decisions prior to construc-
tion, before operating experience is accumulated. Our model is designed to
be used in this setting. By modelling the availability growth process, we are
positioned to inform the modelling of future income streams and capital and
maintenance costs.
The value of growing reliability during system design and development is
widely acknowledged [51]. Nevertheless, there has been no reported use of
reliability growth analysis in an offshore context. Instead, modelling effort
has focussed upon estimating availability performance under operational and
maintenance strategies assuming that the wind farm is operating in steady-
state [43, 39, 4, 3, 41, 12, 25, 16]. Only [3] and [16] consider departures from
steady state by considering ageing; that is, late rather than early life. It
is not possible to investigate growth using the existing availability models
through sensitivity analysis since the models structures do not allow for this.
Hence, the existing models used in offshore wind do not address the issue of
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growing performance, which is an important modelling challenge if effective
and efficient risk management decisions are to be made.
Here we develop a model for availability growth to address the particu-
lar challenges that the offshore wind sector faces. Though our model has a
general formulation meaning and it should have applicability to other sys-
tems for which availability, rather than just reliability, is a key performance
measure. We formulate a model to represent systematic failures triggered
by weaknesses in, for example, design, manufacture and/or installation. The
model, when appropriately combined with stochastic processes representing
random failure and restoration events, provides a measure of availability. We
assume that major interventions to address systemic weaknesses are made
at discrete time points associated with what we term an innovation. By the
term innovation we include, for example, re-design of system parts, major
changes to installation processes, new vessel options for routine maintenance.
In an offshore wind context, such innovations are likely to be scheduled to
allow for the logistic delays in accessing the farm. Between innovations we al-
low for learning effects, since it is not unreasonable to expect maintainers and
operators to continuously adapt their procedures and processes to improve
the execution of routine tasks. The creation of an availability growth model
allows us to explore the impact of different scenarios arising from systemic
weaknesses in equipment, and to examine the cost-effectiveness of mitigation
strategies.
In offshore wind, as for many other system development processes, the
design is evolutionary implying that the current generation is related to the
previous one [37, 53]. For example, technology is largely based on modified
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onshore and early offshore wind turbines. In some areas, such as cable in-
stallation, there has been significant learning through method adaptation [1].
Offshore wind foundations are designed on the basis of principles applied in
oil & gas, and installation of these structures is performed using mainly oil &
gas vessels and procedures [47]. Nevertheless, innovation is necessary for new
generation farms - such as the UK Round III sites - to deal with increased
water depth and distance from shore [1]. Innovation is the driver of change
between generations of product or process design, but is also of itself a major
risk to future performance.
Typically a new system evolutionary design needs to meet an availability
performance target at least equal to that achieved by the previous genera-
tion. On the basis of operational experience from earlier generation systems
and analogous systems, it is possible for suitably qualified experts to make
assessments of potential failure modes, make useful assessments of their im-
pact (e.g. in terms of shortening lifetimes), and advise on potential mitiga-
tion strategies. By using the existing methodologies for expert judgement
processes for this type of problem [49, 23, 7], we have structured our model
through discussion with domain experts and practitioners.
In developing our model we draw upon the existing body of knowledge
for reliability growth modelling and the limited consideration of availability
growth. For example [9, 10, 26, 42, 17] are amongst many authors who pro-
pose models for reliability growth that is typically positioned during product
development, where the goal is to improve reliability by identifying and re-
moving weaknesses. The effect of modifications in such models is represented
as a learning curve [15, 10] but models also exist that allow for the repre-
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sentation of a series of discrete modifications through, for example, struc-
tural changes in the failure intensity [44, 17]. Beyond the classical reliability
growth methods for both hardware and software systems in development,
there are also models proposed for supporting reliability growth during de-
sign [51] and through life [50]. These models tend to be framed from the
perspective of the owner of the design blueprint.
To model availability -rather than reliability- growth, the premise of mod-
elling needs to be extended to represent interventions that intend not only
to remove the sources of potential failures, but also to reduce the restoration
time. There is limited mention of such models in the literature. For exam-
ple, the models found in [48, 29] assess availability growth for software rather
than hardware, but this is achieved exclusively through a fault removal pro-
cess - implying that there are no interventions associated with the restoration
process. Hence, these papers essentially apply reliability growth models to
situations where restoration durations are assumed constant.
Our context requires us to draw on existing thinking about reliability
growth to develop a model for availability growth that can be used not only
by those with design responsibility, but also by those involved in financing
and operating the system. We seek to model availability during early opera-
tional life of a system because this is the period during which many teething
problems are surfaced in use and because of the limited nature of Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) warranties, unavailability in early life has
an impact on both OEM and system operator. Our modelling approach is
distinctive because we provide a single framework which integrates the effect
of interventions intended to improve reliability with the effect of interven-
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tions intended to reduce restoration times, in order to estimate availability
during specified time horizons. We explicitly include in the model the effect
of condition monitoring, as this would allow us to predict the likely impact
of investing in this type of maintenance strategy on system availability. The
model output is an indicator of availability-informed capability that captures
the effect of partially operating turbines on farm energy generation. Reduced
output might occur, for example, when operators de-rate degraded turbines
to accommodate logistic delays in gaining access for maintenance.
In this article we describe the formulation of the growth model and illus-
trate its application to an offshore wind farm example. We believe this article
makes both a methodological and a contextual contribution. Methodologi-
cally we introduce a new model for system availability growth that extends
current knowledge of reliability growth modelling. Contextually we show the
effects of systemic risk on offshore wind farm availability, thereby addressing
a shortcoming of the existing availability models proposed for operational
and maintenance decision support in this industry. As presented in this arti-
cle, our model only considers aleatory uncertainty; that is, natural variability
between different systems, for example the stochastic time to failure of each
wind turbine. When considering the behaviour of future systems, which is
when this model will be particularly useful for decision support, there are
clearly also state-of-knowledge (i.e. epistemic) uncertainties. For example,
in the application example given here, the design modifications are modelled
as perfectly removing anticipated weaknesses. But assuming perfect fixes can
be naive and by extending the model to include representation of state-of-
knowledge uncertainties, we can better model the efficacy of innovations on
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performance. The modelling required to represent state-of-knowledge uncer-
tainty in this setting is quite substantial and goes beyond the objectives of
the present article. In [54] we explain how the availability growth model can
include representation of state-of-knowledge uncertainty, as well as aleatory
uncertainty, and examine the implications of uncertainty assessment for more
effective systemic risk reduction to better support dialogue between the fi-
nancial and engineering stakeholders in the offshore wind sector.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our general ra-
tionale for availability growth modelling, while Section 3 presents the math-
ematical foundations of our model. Section 4 provides an example that ex-
plains how we might scope, populate and use the model for a real context
based on a typical UK Round III wind farm and examines the impact of
appropriately modelling growth. Section 5 concludes by reviewing the limi-
tations as well as benefits of our approach and identifies areas of further work,
including a discussion of the relative value of modelling state-of-knowledge
uncertainties.
2. Modelling Rationale
Technical availability is the key modelling criterion of the system (i.e. the
offshore wind farm). The system is assumed to be operating fully or partially
(i.e. uptime performance) or not (i.e. downtime performance). System per-
formance depends on the performance of constituent subassemblies. Uptime
performance reaches target levels when the actual reliability of subassemblies
is as planned. Likewise, target downtime performance is achieved when there
are no prolonged downtimes of subassemblies due to, for example, logistics
8
Innovation
Design
Minor
Adaptations
Uptime Performance Downtime Performance
Innovation
Vessel Strategy
Innovation
Spares Policy
Availability
Minor
Adaptations
Maintenance
Strategy
Design 
Inadequacy
Operational 
Error
Manuf. 
Fault
Logistics 
Time
Waiting 
Time
Travelling 
Time
Repair 
Time
Minor 
Adaptations
Innovation
Process
Target 
Reliability
Actual 
Reliability
Actual 
Restoration
Target 
Restoration
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for availability growth model. Oval nodes represent
triggers and rectangular nodes represent interventions.
or weather-induced delays.
Figure 1 presents a visual representation of our modelling rationale show-
ing the factors that may increase the chance of below-target uptime and/or
downtime performance and subsequently impact on system availability. The
factors have been identified through conversations with relevant engineers
and categorised according to their effect on failure or restoration processes.
2.1. Factors Influencing Uptime
Inadequacies in the design, manufacturing defects or operational errors
are factors that can lead to premature wear-out, increased vulnerability to
external shocks, or both. Collectively we call these factors Triggers since
they are sources of systemic risk that can reduce subassembly reliability. We
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define three classes of trigger as follows.
Design inadequacies are issues with system design caused either by an
inappropriate blueprint for the specified operating conditions, or by design
environmental parameters that poorly reflect actual operating conditions.
Consider offshore wind transformers which can be placed in the bedplate
exposing them to vibration. Levels of vibration are not fully understood be-
cause new generation turbines are larger and operate further from shore. This
introduces risk of design inadequacy. We anticipate that upscaling offshore
wind subassemblies can introduce more general issues with the design. For
example, it has been observed that larger gearboxes tend to be less reliable
than smaller ones [46].
Manufacturing faults occur when a shortcoming in the production process
control and quality management of the manufacturer allows for defects to
remain and be realised in operation. For example, offshore wind turbine
blades are prone to manufacturer faults as they require a particularly labour-
intensive manufacturing process, increasing the potential for human error
during manufacturing.
Operational errors relate to human error during repair or installation.
For offshore wind farms in particular, installation error can be an important
driver of early-life reliability. Activities such as the connection of transmis-
sion cables, for example, are prone to this type of issue: a combination of
tight deadlines, schedule pressures and task complexity introduce the poten-
tial for faults and errors during installation that can lead to decreased cable
reliability.
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2.2. Factors Influencing Downtime
In general, restoration depends on factors such as difficulties in acquiring
resources and gaining access to site. For example, harsh wind and wave
conditions can render an offshore wind farm site inaccessible for extended
periods of time delaying maintenance activities and extending restoration
times. Offshore wind sites can also experience considerable logistic delays.
Operations like gearbox replacement require expensive specialised jack-up
vessels which are typically hired. So, repair is associated with procedures
such as booking and transferring the vessel between sites, which can result
in additional delay.
We model such weather-induced delay as a random variable, which we call
waiting time. Waiting time represents the period between when maintenance
crew and resources are ready and when the trip to the site commences. The
uncertainty on waiting time is determined conditionally on the failed sub-
assembly, since the type of failure determines the period over which weather
conditions need to be favourable, and on the time of the year, because wait-
ing times are longer in the winter months - at least in the UK. We estimate
the waiting time distributions using historical wind and wave data using an
algorithm developed in [13].
2.3. Interventions
The model aims to capture the integrated effect of all factors affecting sub-
assemblies on system availability, and to predict the evolution of availability
as technical, operational, and organisational interventions are implemented.
We classify Interventions in terms of their effect on availability. As in Ansell
et al. [5], we separate interventions into innovations, which have a major
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effect on performance, and minor adjustments, which result in less radical
improvement.
We define Innovations to be radical actions that change the basic un-
derlying properties of the system. For example, redesigns to address design
issues typify an innovation that affects subassembly reliability. We allow for
the chance of achieving target reliability to differ between a new generation
design and an upgrade. Innovations also relate to asset-management deci-
sions where, for example, employing different operational strategies, such as
fix on failure or charter contracts etc., might result in different logistic delays.
Equally purchasing a new vessel might affect weather waiting times.
We define Minor Adaptations to be interventions that impact on the sys-
tem in a more gradual manner relative to the effect of innovations. Typically,
Minor Adaptations are related to learning and the accumulation of experi-
ence with the system and its operation. For example, as time progresses,
maintenance crews can become more effective conducting low-level mainte-
nance activities such as inspections, calibrations etc. and so may be less
likely to make an error during large-scale maintenance operations such as
replacements.
We also identify a third class of intervention that requires separate con-
sideration in our model. We name this third class Maintenance Strategy.
It represents the influence of maintenance on the condition of subassemblies
and, thus, on the pattern of failures. Maintenance Strategy encompasses both
the type of intervention (i.e. preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance
or condition monitoring) and the effect of intervention on the system condi-
tion (i.e. perfect or imperfect repair). For example, maintenance actions such
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as carbon brush replacement have a minor effect on turbine condition and
are modelled as imperfect repair, implying the subassembly state after main-
tenance is either as it was just before failure, or somewhere in between this
and as good as new. Major maintenance activities, such as hub replacements,
restore the subassembly to its original condition, and are modelled as perfect
repairs. Our model allows for the modelling of different levels of imperfect
maintenance; however, we note that it is not primarily designed to optimise
maintenance logistics, as this would go beyond the level of discrimination of
the model.
3. Availability Growth Model Mathematical Formulation
3.1. A Parametric Model for the Hazard Rate of a Subassembly
To represent subassembly failure behaviour we classify underlying failure
mechanisms broadly into shocks and wear-out. Shocks are external single
stress events whereas wear-out relates to accumulated damage. We assume
that subassemblies go initially through a wear-out free period where shocks
dominate, which ends when wear-out begins. It is not expected for subassem-
blies to age prematurely, and target reliability profiles assume that wear-out
occurs after early life.
We refer to the initial shock-dominating period as Stage 1, and to the
succeeding wear-out and shock period as Stage 2. Let Sj be the time the
subassembly leaves Stage j, for now considered fixed. The lifetime of the
system is broken down into distinct intervals [S0, S1) and [S1, S2) where S0 =
0, S2 =∞. Let U(t) denote the system stage at time t viz.
U(t) = j ⇔ Sj−1 ≤ t < Sj , for j = 1, 2 (1)
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First, we define the failure behaviour of the subassembly distinctly over
the different lifetime stages. For j = 1, 2, let Tj be the elapsed time from
Sj−1, the time the subassembly leaves Stage j − 1, until its first failure from
a mechanism relevant to Stage j. We assume Tj is a continuous random
variable with cumulative distribution function Fj . Given that U(t) = j, the
system has (conditional) hazard rate function, or Force of Mortality (FOM),
given by
mj(tj) =
P (tj ≤ Tj < tj +∆tj)
P (Tj > tj)
=
fj(tj)
1− Fj(tj)
, where tj = t− Sj−1. (2)
Furthermore, let random variableW1 with distribution function G1 represent
the time when wear-out starts having an effect. A subassembly enters Stage
2 only if the onset of wear-out precedes a shock failure. Figure 2 presents a
visual representation of this reasoning.
Figure 2: Lifetime stages of a subassembly until time to first failure T . Tj is the elapsed
time from Sj−1, the time the subassembly leaves Stage j − 1, until its first failure from
a mechanism relevant to Stage j (j = 1, 2). Stage 1 is a shock-dominating period. Stage
2 is a period of both shocks and wear-out mechanisms. W1 is the time that elapses from
start of operation until the subassembly starts to wear (leaves Stage 1).
Let random variable T with distribution function F represent the lifetime
of the system, measured from the start of operation until the first failure.
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Assuming shocks and the onset of wear-out act as independent competing
risks, we can write
T = min{T1,W1}+ T2I(T1>W1) (3)
where IA is the indicator variable of the event A. Now, the (unconditional)
hazard rate of the subassembly given by
h(t) =
P (t ≤ T < t+∆t)
P (T > t)
=
f(t)
1− F (t)
. (4)
can be defined conditionally as
h(t) = h(t|Ht−) = mj(t− Sj−1) (5)
where Ht− is the relevant system data observed until just before time t, such
as the lifetime stage, as well as wider operation and maintenance information.
Later this will be specified in more detail.
Shock failures, which dominate Stage 1 of the subassembly lifetime, oc-
cur at random and are represented by a constant hazard rate. Using an
exponential distribution for F1 implies that m1(t1) = ρ is constant. Wear-
out mechanisms appear when the subassembly enters Stage 2, in addition to
shock failures, implying that m2(t2) = ρ+ h(t2) where h(t2) is the wear-out
hazard and can be represented by a monotonically increasing function - with
time, or any other proxy of damage accumulation.
The choice of an increasing hazard rate function to represent wear-out
depends on the level of knowledge of the underlying degradation mecha-
nisms and the available data. Our model structure allows degradation to be
modelled explicitly or implicitly, depending on the application. When degra-
dation data are available allowing internal failure mechanisms to be traced,
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then a degradation model can be used. See, for example [32]. If sufficient
degradation data to allow model specification are not available, we represent
wear-out failure using parametric models for the lifetime distribution. For
illustration in this article we assume a Weibull model to represent wear-out
failures, implying that m2(t2) = ρ+ ηβ(t2 − s1)
β−1.
Our parametric model bears similarities with other approaches. For ex-
ample, we break down the time to signal into smaller segments (i.e. shock
and wear-out dominated periods) to model system lifetime in more detail
than the Delay Time model [8, 52] and we relax the assumption made by
[6] that the times at which the system enters a lifetime stage are always
observable by the operator.
Figure 3 illustrates the hazard rate for a subassembly entering Stage 2 at
time S1 = s1. A subassembly achieving at least target reliability will have
relatively lower rate of shock failures ρ, an onset of wear-out s1 outside the
early life window, and relatively slower rate of increase in the wear-out hazard
rate, as shown in Figure 3(a). If the subassembly performs below target then
it is subject to more frequent random failures (ρ′ > ρ) throughout the whole
early life and premature, more severe wear-out (s′1 < s1); see Figure 3(b).
3.2. Condition Monitoring of Subassemblies Subject to Wear-out
Condition Monitoring (CM) can indicate incipient failure by tracking
measurable wear-out indicators associated with the underling degradation
process and releasing a signal prior to failure; see Figure 4. For example,
wear-out of offshore wind turbine gears and bearings can increase the gen-
eration rate of particles above a certain size in gearbox oil [24]. Upon the
observation of the CM signal, operators can respond by, for example, de-
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(a) Target (b) Below target
Figure 3: Subassembly hazard rate: a subassembly with below-target reliability (b) has
more frequent shock failures than in (a) and premature and/or more severe wear-out.
rating a damaged turbine, to extend its residual life and allow time to plan
maintenance actions. We include CM explicitly within the availability growth
model because it allows us to predict the likely impact of investing in CM on
farm availability.
To capture the effect of CM on a subassembly’s failure behaviour, we
extend the hazard model presented in Section 3.1 to include the wear-out
indicator. We assume the CM indicator starts evolving when the subassembly
enters Stage 2 at time S1 (i.e. it begins to wear). Given that the signal
threshold is passed after time W2, counted from S1, then time S2 = S1 +
W2 is when the subassembly enters Stage 3. T3 denotes the subassembly’s
lifetime given that a CM signal is observed. Therefore, the CM signal further
partitions the subassembly lifetime, as shown in Figure 5, into
0 ≡ S0 < S1 < S2 < S3 ≡ ∞. (6)
Since the degradation and indicator processes are associated, the time to
the CM signal, W2, and the conditional lifetime of the subassembly in Stage
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Figure 4: Degradation process and indicator process curves: the two processes are corre-
lated; the indicator process reaches the critical threshold before the degradation process,
giving a signal prior to actual failure.
2, T2, should both depend on the same underlying degradation process. Let
W2 have distribution G2. We can write F2(t2) = F2(t2|θ) and G2(w2) =
G2(w2|θ) where θ is the vector of the degradation model parameters. Given
θ, T2 and W2 are conditionally independent random variables, then within
an independent competing risks framework, the subassembly lifetime in (3)
can be written as
T = min{T1,W1}+min{T2,W2}I(T1>W1) + T3I(T2>W2) (7)
where IA is the indicator variable of event A. Note that if upon observation
of the CM signal at time S2, an operator chooses not to act (e.g.to de-rate
the turbine comprising the degrading subassembly) then random variable T3
has the same distribution as T2.
To apply the availability model, the anticipated effectiveness of CM (i.e.
the more correlated F2(·) and G2(·), the more effective the CM) and the
18
Figure 5: Lifetime stages of a subassembly subject to condition monitoring until time
to first failure T . Tj is the elapsed time from Sj−1, the time the subassembly leaves
Stage j − 1, until its first failure from a mechanism relevant to Stage j (j = 1, 2). Stage
1 is a shock-dominating period. Stage 2 is the period when both wear-out and shocks
mechanisms are present, but before the release of a CM signal. Stage 3 is the period when
both wear-out and shocks mechanisms are present, after the observation of a CM signal.
W1 is the time that elapses from start of operation until the subassembly starts to wear;
W2 is the time that elapses from the onset of wear-out until the CM signal is observed.
operating practice in response to the CM signal should be indicated. For
example, a particular CM system may give a signal far in advance of failure,
upon which operating performance is reduced to partial operation through
some planned intervention.
3.3. Intensity of Events
The hazard rate given in (2) describes the subassembly lifetime in terms
of its time to first failure. Since offshore wind subassemblies are repairable
systems, we use a marked point process {Tn, Jn}n≥1 to describe their alter-
nating behaviour between failure and repair, where Jn = 1 when a failure
occurs at Tn and Jn = 0 otherwise (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .). Let N(t) and M(t) be
the number of failures and restorations in (0, t] respectively, where t is cal-
endar time. The conditional intensity of the marked point process is defined
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as
ι(t|Ht−) =


λ(t|Ht−) : subassembly operates just before time t
µ(t|Ht−) : subassembly does not operate just before time t = 0
where
λ(t|Ht−) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(failure in [t, t+∆t)]|Ht−)
∆t
(8)
and
µ(t|Ht−) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(restoration in [t, t +∆t)]|Ht−)
∆t
. (9)
Ht− is the history of the subassembly until, but not including, time t. History
represents the information about a subassembly’s past life that needs to be
captured to support model computations. For simplicity, from this point
forward we use ι(t), λ(t) and µ(t) instead of ι(t|Ht−), λ(t|Ht−) and µ(t|Ht−)
respectively.
The intensity λ(t), or the Rate of Occurrence of Failures (ROCOF), is
the outcome of the interaction of the inherent reliability characteristics of the
subassembly, described by the hazard h(t), with the maintenance type (i.e.
corrective or preventive) and effect (i.e. perfect or imperfect repair). The
hazard defines the baseline condition of the subassembly, while the mainte-
nance type and effect determine how this is controlled during operation. In
our model, the effect of maintenance is captured via the concept of virtual
age v(t) [27]. We have
λ(t) = h(v(t)), t > 0 (10)
where v(t) is equal to the cumulative uptime denoted with x(t), where
x(t) =
N(t)+M(t)∑
k;Jk=1(Jk=0)
Tk − Tk−1. (11)
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For a new system v(t) = 0. Therefore, perfect maintenance essentially resets
the virtual age of the turbine to zero, whereas minimal repair sets its value
to the one it had just before failure. Several models have been developed for
cases where repair effect lies between perfect and imperfect, e.g. [14], and
might provide alternative formulations for the availability model.
Whereas virtual age v(t) describes the effect of maintenance actions and
repair, the effect of routine maintenance, such as oil changes, cleaning and
lubrication, is captured implicitly by assuming that the pattern implied by
the intensity in (10) assumes that such actions are undertaken properly. It is
interesting to note that under the assumption of minimal repair, the hazard
rate h(·) and the failure intensity λ(·) have the same mathematical formu-
lation, even though they represent different quantities. It also emerges that
the history Ht− in (10) not only includes a subassembly’s lifetime stage, but
also its virtual age, as defined on the basis of information on the time and
type of the last maintenance.
The repair intensity µ(t) can be expressed by a relationship similar to (10)
where h(·) relates to the maintenance time distribution and v(t) accounts for
the amount of continuous time the system is under repair (i.e. cumulative
downtime) as measured from the last failure event and excluding any logistic
or weather delays.
3.4. Effect of Interventions
3.4.1. Innovations
Since innovations are planned large-scale operations intended to have a
radical effect on system performance, we model them discretely at times
S1, S2, . . . , Sm, which are assumed to be known a priori. Within the UK
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offshore wind energy context this is a reasonable assumption, since interven-
tions such as design upscaling and subassembly re-fitting typically take place
during the summer months, to take advantage of the relatively less severe
weather conditions on site. Therefore, innovations partition the early life
(0, T ] of the system as
0 =< R1 < R2 < . . . < Rm = T.
Let ιi(t) and hi(t), t > Ri, denote the conditional intensity and hazard func-
tion respectively of a system after the i-th innovation (i = 0, 1, ...). Similarly
to (10), the failure intensity and hazard function are associated through
equation
λi(t) = hi(v(t)), t > 0. (12)
We assume the (i+1)-th innovation has an effect on the basic behaviour
of the subassembly, as expressed via hi(·). Innovations intend to bring the
below-target reliability back to the target level and shift the subassembly
profile from the one portrayed in Figure 3(b) to the one in Figure 3(a). This
is achieved by making modelling choices to either reduce the shock failure
rate (ρi < ρi+1), or delay wear-out (Si1 < S
i+1
1 ), or decrease the wear-out
rate. For the latter case, the wear-out rate can be modified by modulating
the scale parameter of the lifetime distribution. For example, [38] make
a similar assumption when capturing enhancements in a software reliability
context. [17] assumes that innovations impact the scale parameter of the Non
Homogeneous Poisson Process model, whereas the shape parameter after
intervention remains the same. In the context of accelerated life testing,
[32, 35] allow a change in stress level to impact the location of the log-
lifetime (i.e. the scale parameter of the lifetime distribution), rather than
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the failure mechanism as expressed via the shape parameter of the lifetime
distribution. However, these assertions are typically formed on the basis of
statistical analysis, and the assumption that increased stress impacts only on
one parameter is not always appropriate - see [31, 33] and references therein.
To impose the orderings implied by the effect of innovations on shocks
and wear-out, we intentionally use a simple version of the model and assume
the following mathematical relationships:
ρi+1 = φiρ
i, Si+11 = (1 + φi)S
i
1 and η
i+1 = φiη
i (13)
where ηi is the scale parameter of the lifetime distribution of a system sub-
jected to i innovations and 0 < φi ≤ 1 is a fix-effectiveness parameter. One
can produce a more elaborate model by defining as many fix-effectiveness pa-
rameters as the number of parameters affected by the innovation, or simplify
the model further by assuming that φi = φ for every i. Regardless of the
choice, determining the intensity in (10) requires information on the number
of innovations undertaken to be included in history Ht− .
As an example, consider a subassembly subject only to wear-out with
hazard rate
h0(v(t)) = ηβ(v(t))β−1, (14)
and, suppose that the subassembly is subject only to corrective maintenance
with minimal repair and negligible restoration times. These assumptions
imply that v(t) = t and that
λ(t) = hi(t) = φi−1ηβtβ−1 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. (15)
Figure 6 shows these assumptions result in a stepwise change in the sub-
assembly intensity.
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Figure 6: Innovations (φ = 0.9) occur every two time periods. The lifetime of the system
is represented by a Weibull distribution with shape parameter β = 1.5 and scale param-
eter η = 0.5. The system is subject to corrective maintenance with minimal repair and
restoration times are assumed negligible.
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3.4.2. Minor Adaptations
Recall that the hazard in (10) expresses the failure behaviour of a sub-
assembly subject to routine maintenance. As experience accumulates and
operators learn, maintenance practices are adjusted and procedures are im-
proved. These changes, referred to as minor adaptations, can have an almost
continuous positive effect on system performance as expressed by the failure
or restoration intensities. We model this effect in terms of function ϕ(·).
The failure intensity of a subassembly after the i-th innovation and sub-
ject to minor adaptations is now given by
λ(t) = hi(v(t))ϕ(t). (16)
A number of formulations for ϕ(t) can be used to represent this ‘learning
effect’ due to minor adaptations. Here, we choose a function that is bounded
and non-increasing function of t to represent the decreasing chance of failure
resulting from learning, and we have
ϕ(t) = 1−
t
t+ γ
. (17)
Since learning is the result of accumulated operating experience, it is
reasonable to assume that minor adaptations depend on calendar time t,
and the history Ht− should include this information to allow determination
of the failure intensity. In Figure 7 one can see how the failure intensity of
the subassembly used in the simple example described previously is modified
due to minor adaptations, before any innovations take place.
3.5. Estimation of System Availability Performance
A performance indicator we call availability-informed capability is derived
as an output of the mathematical model. Our capability measure aims to
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Figure 7: Effect of learning on failure intensity when minor adaptations occur continu-
ously. In this example: system lifetime is represented by a Weibull distribution with shape
parameter β = 1.5 and scale parameter η = 0.5, and the system is subject to corrective
maintenance only with minimal repair and negligible restoration times.
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capture the effect of partial performance of subassemblies on the system
output, in particular the effect of partial operation of wind turbines on the
energy output from the farm. Since the power generated by a farm is the
aggregate of the power generated by individual turbines, the availability-
informed capability is defined as the fraction
Cfarm(t) =
n∑
i=1
Pi(t)
n∑
i=1
POi(t)
(18)
where Pi(t) is the average output power of turbine i at time t (calculated
by applying the power curve of a turbine to a reference wind speed distri-
bution at hub height), given the turbine’s operating condition, and POi(t)
is the average output power of turbine i at time t assuming it is fully op-
erational. Therefore the average farm availability-informed capability over
some interval (τ1, τ2) is given by
C(τ1,τ2) =
1
τ2 − τ1
∫ τ2
τ1
Cfarm(t)dt. (19)
A full explanation of this performance indicator and a discussion of why it
is regarded as a meaningful measure of production capability in the context
of financial analysis of offshore wind farms is given in [54].
A capability estimate is computed by representing the mathematical
model as a point process simulation. The flowchart in Figure 8 provides
the high level logic of the simulation of events through time and shows the
types of events simulated and the relationships between them. For example,
exposure to the triggers of systemic risk, shown by the shaded nodes, influ-
ences the failure events of subassemblies by modulating the hazard function,
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as does the condition of the subassembly (i.e. the virtual age) that gets mod-
ulated by maintenance. History represents the combined information about,
for example, the number of past innovations and calendar time.
4. Example
We now illustrate the application of the availability growth model for
a new generation offshore wind farm. Unlike other availability modelling
approaches used in an offshore wind context, our model allows for the repre-
sentation of both the gradual effect of minor adaptations, introduced through
the accumulation of operating experience, as well as the more radical effect
of innovations, such as the replacement of subassemblies with inherent weak-
nesses with improved versions. In our example we compare model outputs
under two scenarios: when systemic risk due to design weaknesses is con-
sidered (i.e. growth is explicitly modelled) and when this type of risk is
omitted (i.e. as in current availability models for offshore wind). The aim
of this comparison is to demonstrate the consequence of failing to represent
systemic risks, as well as the subsequent availability growth resulting from
restorative action, in estimating farm technical performance, energy output
and hence expected financial return.
Our example is based on a typical large-scale Round III UK offshore wind
farm and our modelling has been developed in collaboration with wind energy
experts. Specifically, we translated the conceptual framework shown in Fig-
ure 1 into a process to support the customisation of the general model for the
particular context as follows: firstly, we defined the system and its critical
subassemblies, for which the model was to be built and scoped the avail-
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Flow between iterations Flow between iterations 
Figure 8: High-level logic of simulation of events through time. Solid lines represent relationships between variables; Dotted
lines represent interventions to grow availability; Grey nodes denote triggers of systemic risk.
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ability growth model; secondly, we articulated the reliability and restoration
targets for the system subassemblies based upon the achievable performance
of similar relevant parts which have accrued operational experience; thirdly,
we considered the causes and effects of failure so that we appropriately model
the triggers on the uptime performance, as well as the impact of interventions
on uptime and downtime performance.
4.1. Scoping the Wind Farm System Model
Our UK round III wind farm, currently at pre-construction stage, will
comprise 150 5MW turbines. The turbines have novel design features and
are larger scale than earlier versions. Eight subassemblies (i.e. gearbox, gen-
erator, frequency converter, transformer, main shaft bearing, blades, tower,
foundations, collection cable and transmission cable) have been identified
as critical through discussion with subject experts, because they are con-
sidered to be subject to high technical and physical risk. We model each
of the critical subassemblies explicitly and treat the remaining non-critical
subassemblies as one modelling group.
Availability-informed capability is to be estimated for the first five years
of operation, which is the UK warranty period. The farm is intended to start
operation in the summer months. Engineering experts have identified the
gearbox and the frequency converter as being at high risk because these are
the subassemblies more likely to have design weaknesses. Therefore, in the
modelling we examine scenarios associated with the prevalence of systemic
risk associated with such design weaknesses and the impact of intervention
strategies both on availability levels and financially in terms of energy pro-
duction loss.
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We set the target reliability for offshore turbines to equal that achieved
by mature onshore turbines since this is consistent with engineering require-
ments. Analysis of relevant data shows that onshore turbines achieve a failure
rate of 3.81 failures/year. This failure rate includes failures of any subassem-
bly and severity, and can be broken down to rates for specific subassemblies
[22]. We use a turbine breakdown similar to that used in onshore analyses,
which allows us to set the target reliability for each offshore subassembly
equal to the level achieved by its onshore counterpart. Table 1 gives values
for the target failure rates for the critical subassemblies, whereas the target
failure rate for the non-critical group is the sum of the rates of the non-critical
subassemblies comprising the group [22].
Following [41, 18], we categorise the effects of failure into minor, moderate
and major. Restoration durations depend on the failure severity and are
taken to be 6 hours, 1 day and 2 days for a minor, moderate and major
failure respectively. The proportion of failures of different severities for each
of the critical subassemblies is also shown in Table 1 and, again, is based
on the experience from onshore farms which is considered requisite for our
offshore context in this example.
Our farmmaintenance strategy includes preventive and corrective actions.
The turbines will be subject to bi-annual overhauls during which subassem-
blies are refurbished and for modelling purposes we treat this as re-setting
the subassembly virtual age to 50% of its value prior to the refurbishment.
Condition monitoring (CM) will be installed on the gearboxes and will pro-
vide continuous data giving information about the state of the subassembly
with an average run length between signal and occurrence of failure of ap-
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Subassembly Target Failure Rate
Failure Apportionment
Major Moderate Minor
Gearbox 0.228f/yr 0.09 0.27 0.64
Generator 0.266f/yr 0.10 0.26 0.64
Frequency Converter 0.456f/yr 0.04 0.18 0.78
Transformer 0.076f/yr 0.04 0.16 0.8
Main Shaft Bearing 0.038f/yr 0.25 0.15 0.6
Blades 0.114f/yr 0.04 0.21 0.75
Tower 0.114f/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Foundations 0.038f/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Non-critical group 2.47/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Collection Cable 1 × 10−6f/km/yy
Transmission Cable 1 × 10−6f/km/yr
Table 1: Subassemblies target and apportioned failure rates. Source: data from [22, 41, 18].
proximately 1.5 months. Finally, minor adaptations are assumed to improve
subassembly reliability in a gradual manner. The minor adaptation param-
eter γ has been chosen on the basis of providing a reasonable learning curve
effect based on historical experience from related farms.
Observation of the CM signal will allow operators to de-rate the turbine
to limit its output in order to extend its life until the next scheduled mainte-
nance and to reduce the chance of a hard failure. If the fault signalled by the
CM cannot be rectified remotely, then the affected subassemblies join the list
of jobs awaiting repair. More generally, corrective repair will be conducted
on a first come, first served basis and will be constrained by the available
maintenance resources and the logistical accessibility. Weather delays are de-
termined as described in [13] for subassembly failure types. For example, the
average waiting time for a major gearbox failure is 9 days during the sum-
mer months and 18 days during the winter months. The condition to which
an affected subassembly returns after maintenance depends on the severity
of failure determined previously. A minimal failure is treated with minimal
repair and the subassembly is returned to an as-bad-as-old condition, while
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moderate and major failures result in repairs that are believed to return the
subassembly to 85% and 60% of what its condition was just before failure
respectively.
As mentioned, the major concerns about the new turbine to be installed
in our wind farm are the design weaknesses in the gearbox and the frequency
converter. These weaknesses, should they exist, will be prevalent in all tur-
bines in the farm, therefore they will trigger all similar subassemblies to wear
prematurely and will therefore be a source of systemic risk. To represent sys-
temic weaknesses in the model, it is necessary to determine the reliability of
subassemblies, in terms of hazard functions, given the presence of triggers.
In our example we used a structured expert judgement elicitation process to
obtain point value estimates of the parameters for the hazard-induced haz-
ard functions of each critical subassembly. Note that the expert judgement
information was obtained as part of a larger exercise reported in [55]. Ta-
ble 2 shows the point values used in this application for the scenario where
systemic risk due to design weaknesses is to be explicitly modelled.
Gearbox Frequency Converter
Shocks λ = 0.019 -
(Exponential)
Wear-out Onset µ = 0.335 µ = 0.992
(Normal) σ = 0.01 σ = 0.01
Signal η = 15 -
(Weibull) β = 1.5 -
Full Operation η = 5.15 η = 2.2
(Weibull) β = 1.19 β = 1.2
Partial Operation η = 5 -
(Weibull) β = 1.5 -
Table 2: Point estimates of parameters based on expert judgement to reflect the effect of
premature wearout due to design inadequacy of gearbox and frequency converter. The
CM indicator relates to gearbox degradation. Unit of time is a year.
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Our example aims to highlight the importance of representing systemic
risks in farm availability performance - which is a novel feature of our growth
model. Therefore we now examine the scenario where upgrades intended to
address design weaknesses of the gearbox and frequency converter designs
are rolled out across the turbines in the farm in Year 2 (i.e. a trigger exists)
and compare it to a baseline scenario where there are no systemic weaknesses
(i.e. the trigger does not exist).
4.2. Findings
Our modelling provides performance profiles for the farm over the first
five years of operation, starting in summer of Year 0, for both scenarios. The
model has been developed as a modular simulation in Matlab, making it
feasible to replace or to extend modelling features. Monte Carlo simulations
based on the computational model logic shown in Figure 8 are used to cal-
culate the aleatory uncertainty on the availability-informed capability on a
two-weekly basis using N = 100 runs. This is a limited number of simulation
runs but the choice was made as a practical trade-off between simulation
runtime and estimation accuracy. Further, since our primary goal here is to
examine patterns in availability performance profiles, we have shown only
the 50% quantiles in the model output plots.
Figure 9 illustrates the 50% quantile of bi-weekly availability-informed ca-
pability profiles under the two scenarios. When systemic design weaknesses
are not considered explicitly in the analysis, Figure 9(a) shows that perfor-
mance is below the typical target of 97% capability for the first quarter of
Year 1, before gradually improving due to the effects of minor adaptations
to achieve an availability of around 99%. However, as Figure 9(b) shows, the
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systemic effects of design inadequacies can reduce early farm performance
to a level below 90% capability. Our results show that the predicted farm
performance deteriorates prematurely during the first two years of operation
until innovations in the form of the design upgrades are undertaken during
the summer months of Year 2. Following the successful mitigation of systemic
risk, performance increases gradually. Figure 10 shows the equivalent esti-
mated failure intensity rate for the farm for our two scenarios. The common
learning effects due to minor adaptations of, for example, procedures lead to
pattern of reduction in the failure intensity under Scenario 1. The impact of
systemic risk due to the design weaknesses appears as an increasing failure
intensity over the first two years of operation before decreasing substantially
over the last half of Year 3 when the full effects of the design modification
combined with the minor adaptations are achieved across the farm.
By applying the wind speed distribution on the power curve of a turbine,
the total farm energy production and associated revenue can be estimated.
Table 3 provides the results under our two scenarios. If the energy price is
£155 per MWh, and without modelling triggers of systemic risk, then the
expected revenue over the first 5 years of operation is computed to be 1, 760
million pounds. However when systemic risk is properly accounted for in the
analysis, the farm generates a revenue of 1, 722 million pounds over the same
period. This implies that failing to model growth in availability, but instead
assuming that steady-state performance can be achieved from the outset, can
lead to an overestimation of farm revenue in the range of 38 million pounds
even before taking into account the cost of innovations. In this example these
costs would be those accrued in the re-design and re-fitting of 150 problematic
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frequency converters and gearboxes.
The example shows clearly what kind of impact systemic risks can have
on wind farm financial performance. Current modelling of offshore wind farm
availability does not take account of growth due to the risks associated with
innovation, leading to overoptimistic planning and high costs of mitigation.
Simply having awareness of this type of problem during planning and con-
tracting can focus minds on maintaining options to deal with the nature of
this issue.
Scenario
Early Life Output
Energy (GWh) Revenue (million £)
No Triggers 11,355 1,760
Triggers 11,109 1,722
Table 3: Expected farm output over early life assuming average wind speed under two
scenarios and an energy price of £155 per MWh.
5. Conclusions and Further Work
We have presented an availability growth model for a system, such as an
offshore wind farm, where innovations might be made during early opera-
tion to improve performance and estimates of availability are required prior
to entry into service. Importantly, this includes exploration of mitigation
strategies for the initial period of operation, should availability problems
emerge, and should influence logistics planning and options on service pro-
vision. While our availability growth model has been motivated by, and its
application illustrated for, the offshore wind problem, the generic structure
of the model means that it can be adapted to other domains where commer-
cially unproven technology or processes are used. The model presented is
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designed to provide insight into the effectiveness of interventions on growth
in system performance by providing availability estimates under different sce-
narios. Our example for a typical UK Round III wind farm highlights the
importance of being able to meaningfully assess farm performance over early
life when systemic risks due to design, maintenance and operational weak-
nesses may still exist. The model provides a means of measuring the impact
of systemic risk on availability performance and can be used to quantify the
financial implications of underestimating performance relative to target.
The model, as presented here, considers only aleatory uncertainties and
allows the exploration of different scenarios with decision makers. This is
useful for dealing with managers in industry as it allows them to explore
the implications of issues that they are aware of, but are not currently mod-
elling. A more sophisticated mathematical approach which uses epistemic
uncertainties to create a more formal rational decision-making model frame-
work is developed in a further paper [54]. However, this further approach
inevitably requires that decision makers “buy-in” to the expert uncertainty
assessments which have to be gathered from a variety of different stakehold-
ers. Since the availability growth scenario approach presented here already
enables decision makers to explore key problems without having to commit
to a more conceptually sophisticated and complex approach, it is genuinely
useful both to deal with those problems where the more complex approach
would probably not make a difference, and also to motivate them to go on
to the more complex approach when it is needed. Our point of view in this
regard is consistent with that expressed by I.J. Good [21] who said that a ra-
tional decision maker should take account of the cost of the decision analysis
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(to all parties) as well as the direct costs and benefits of the decision.
Our current model code is based on the set of assumptions described.
While reasonable for our example domain, they might need to be developed
for other application areas. Further, the implementation of sensitivity or
uncertainty analysis would require further consideration of the simulation
model computation so that appropriate numbers of simulation runs can be
efficiently generated to provide suitably accurate results. For example, fu-
ture work could involve the use of metamodels such as emulators [36, 28] to
approximate the simulation model and to speed up computation.
Our example provides insight into how the general growth model can be
customised for a particular system by articulating the modelling choices. For
example, the classification of subassemblies to critical and non-critical, as well
as the specific triggers considered, was achieved using the structured judge-
ment of wind energy experts, and can be modified to reflect the systemic risks
relevant to a particular situation. Similarly, the condition monitoring charac-
teristics, which we represented by the timing of the signal relevant to failure
and the operational response, can be modified to represent actual mainte-
nance of a given system. To build a meaningful model for decision makers
requires engagement with relevant engineering experts to both qualitatively
structure the model and to quantify selected parameters. We have developed
a scientific protocol to support collection and preparation of data details of
which are provided in [55]. Ongoing work includes further engagement with
stakeholders experienced in offshore wind farm engineering, technology and
operations to conduct validation studies of the availability growth model and
supporting data management processes.
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(a) Scenario 1: without systemic risk
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(b) Scenario 2: with systemic risk
Figure 9: Estimated early-life availability-informed capability for simulated scenarios: (a)
No recognised gearbox and frequency converter design weaknesses; (b) design inadequacy
weaknesses result in deteriorating farm performance over the next two years; performance
reaches target levels once issues are removed through implementation of innovations.
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(a) Scenario 1: without systemic risk
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(b) Scenario 2: with systemic risk
Figure 10: Estimated early-life failure intensity rate denoted by ROCOF for simulated
scenario:(a) No recognised gearbox and frequency converter design weaknesses; (b) design
inadequacy weaknesses result in increasing rate over the next two years before reducing
after effect of innovation.
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